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Abstract
The Council of the European Union is the European Union’s most powerful legislative
body. Yet, we still have limited information about Council politics because of the lack of
suitable data. This paper validates a new approach to studying Council politics entitled
DICEU – Debates in the Council of the European Union. This approach is the first to
leverage the public videos of Council deliberations as a data source. We demonstrate
the face, convergent, and predictive validity of DICEU data. Governments’ ideal points
scaled from these videos yield meaningful and well-known conflict dimensions.
Moreover, governments’ positions during Council negotiations correlate highly with
expert assessments and predict subsequent votes on legislative acts. We conclude
that DICEU data provide a promising new approach to studying Council politics and
multilevel governance.
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The Council of the European Union (EU) is the EU’s primary legislative body,
where national ministers discuss, negotiate, and vote on legislative proposals. Most
research on politics in the Council is based on either expert interview data or
voting records. These data sources have generated key insights into intergovern-
mental politics in the Council, exploring what factors drive governments’ position-
taking and voting (e.g. Bailer et al., 2015; Hagemann et al., 2017; Hagemann and
Høyland, 2008; Thomson, 2011) and the nature of alignments and latent conflict
dimensions in Council politics (e.g. Mattila, 2009; Plechanovova, 2011; Thomson,
2009; Thomson et al., 2004; Zimmer et al., 2005). They have also been used to test
different bargaining models and estimate the distribution of power among member
states and across EU institutions (e.g. Bailer, 2004; Costello and Thomson, 2013;
Golub, 2012; Rasmussen and Reh, 2013; Thomson, 2008, 2011). However, existing
data sources have key limitations when it comes to studying legislative politics in
the Council. Expert data may be influenced by interviewee bias and are hard to
replicate for other researchers (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita, 2004). Voting data, in
turn, tell us little about the preceding negotiation process and lack variation,
since 98% of all votes are cast in favor of the proposal (Hagemann et al., 2017).
In addition, none of the available datasets on Council politics captures the evolu-
tion of negotiations on legislative files over time.
In this article, we propose a novel approach to studying the Council, which uses
video recordings of public deliberations. Since the entry into force of the Lisbon
Treaty, the Council must deliberate in public when negotiating legislative files and
discussing strategic questions1 and all debates are video-streamed online. We pre-
sent the first study that rigorously collects, codes, and validates these public delib-
erations as a data source to study the Council. We label our data gathering
approach DICEU – “Debates in the Council of the European Union”. The approach
produces textual data of all speeches by national ministers and other representa-
tives in the Council as well as human codings of intergovernmental conflicts.
We validate the DICEU approach in three steps. First, we demonstrate its face
validity with a pilot dataset covering Council meetings in the Economic and
Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) configuration between 2010 and 2015.
Scaling governments’ ideal points with an item-response theory (IRT) model as
well as different quantitative text analysis (QTA) models yields meaningful latent
conflict dimensions that are in line with prior knowledge about politics in the
Council. High correlations between the ideal points scaled from human coding
and those from text highlight the potential of QTA models for future analyses of
Council politics. Moreover, we demonstrate DICEU’s potential for generating
further discoveries by tracing the dynamic development of conflict in the
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Council over time as well as measuring new quantities of interest (such as minis-
ters’ sentiment or issue attention). Second, we assess convergent validity with
expert data from the Council, using the “Decision-making in the European
Union” (DEU) dataset as a benchmark (Thomson et al., 2006, 2012). We find
that DEU and DICEU positions on the exact same issues correlate highly,
which suggests that the public deliberations allow us to capture governments’
negotiation positions. Finally, we investigate predictive validity of our position
measures on Council votes. We find that governments’ DICEU positions are a
significant predictor of their voting behavior in the Council, even when controlling
for factors that are known to influence voting.
In conclusion, we argue that the DICEU approach offers a rich data source on
Council deliberations that can be used to study many aspects of politics in the EU
and its member states. To facilitate further research, we make our entire DICEU
pilot dataset on ECOFIN (2010–2015), as well as our DICEU codebook and
related documentation, publicly available.
Data on Council politics
The vast majority of empirical research on politics in the Council relies either on
expert interviews (e.g. Kleine, 2013; Thomson et al., 2006, 2012; Wasserfallen
et al., 2019) or on official voting records (e.g. Hagemann, 2007; Hagemann and
Høyland, 2008; Mattila, 2004, 2009) as the main data source. In addition, some
work has analyzed official documents from the Council (e.g. H€age, 2014; Obholzer,
2014; Sullivan and Selck, 2007) and the policy statements that governments can
submit with their voting record (Hagemann et al., 2019). While these data have
produced important insights, they also have limitations.
The drawbacks of relying on expert data on the Council are well known: first,
expert interviews must be conducted in close temporal proximity to negotiations in
the Council to reduce the potential problem of post-diction bias (Bueno de
Mesquita, 2004). The more distant the memory of negotiations, the more likely
are experts to use cues, such as the negotiation outcome or their personal political
convictions, when reconstructing actor positions. This likely introduces bias.
Second, the social scientific standard of replicability is ill-defined in the case of
expert interviews. While analyses of voting data, in contrast, are easily replicable,
they only reflect the very last phase of Council politics, when legislation is passed,
and cannot tell us about the actual proceedings of negotiations. Moreover,
since a strong consensus norm in Council voting prevails (Heisenberg, 2005;
Novak, 2013), with less than 1.5% of votes cast in opposition to legislative pro-
posals in the 1999–2011 time period, variation in voting data is very limited
(Hagemann et al., 2017). These consensual votes thus give relatively limited infor-
mation about government positions during the negotiations. A more recent inno-
vation in the literature on Council politics is large-N data created on the basis of
official Council documents; for instance, draft minutes of Council meetings as well
as presidency notes on the state of negotiations (see H€age, 2014; Obholzer, 2014).
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One concern with this approach is that we know little about how the national
presidencies may differ in the degree to which they make Council documents public
as well as the amount of information they include in these documents (see also
Hillebrandt et al., 2014).
Finally, existing data sources also do not allow us to study the dynamics of the
negotiation process, as they are usually snapshots of one time point. Even the most
extensive expert project on the Council, the DEU data (Thomson et al., 2006,
2012), does not contain sufficient data to estimate how government positions on
key conflict dimensions (e.g. left–right, pro-anti regulation, pro-anti integration)
develop over time. As a result, we still lack dynamic time-series-cross-section data
in Council research. This prevents us from investigating research questions on the
dynamics of Council negotiations, and it also makes the causal identification of
effects more difficult, since many causal inference methods rely on tempo-
ral ordering.
To address some of these limitations, we present a new complementary
approach to studying Council politics. We argue that videos of public deliberations
of the Council provide a promising, and hitherto largely unexplored, data source
for understanding the Council. While the Council has historically been a largely
opaque institution of EU-level policy-making detached from the public eye, it has
gradually become more transparent (see e.g. Hillebrandt et al., 2014). In June 2006,
the European Council decided to make a large proportion of its legislative delib-
erations in the Council open to the public (European Council, 2006). From late
2006, webcasts of the open deliberations were made available on the Council’s
website in 20 different languages. Since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in
December 2009, the Council configurations have to meet in public when they
deliberate or vote on draft legislative acts, or discuss presidency work programs
and other questions of strategic relevance. All these meetings must be broadcast on
the Council’s video streaming website (video.consilium.europa.eu).
While Council deliberations are now video-recorded, this increased transparen-
cy has not turned the Council into a classical legislature where representatives
address a public audience in plenary debates. Instead, ministers’ speeches during
Council deliberations are much more technical and forthright than most parlia-
mentary speeches (see the Online appendix for examples). Ministers discuss the
details of policy-making and they openly advise colleagues on how to deal with
domestic voters. This suggests the videos show actual negotiations, or at least
part thereof.2
Videos of public deliberations overcome key limitations of existing data sources.
They are not affected by post-diction bias, such as interviews may be, and they can
be analyzed at any point in time (if archived). They also provide the most direct
measurement of actor positions, free of any information filters applied by experts
or officials. Compared to Council documents, such as draft minutes of Council
meetings, they provide a full account of all public deliberations rather than short
summaries. Analyses using video data are also fully replicable, as researchers have
access to the exact same source material. Importantly, this is also a very rich data
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source, as the Council produces around 100 hours of video material per calendar
year, which allows researchers to observe the dynamics of policy-making in the
Council across a large number of policy issues.
The DICEU approach
To study the Council using videos of public deliberations, we have developed the
DICEU data gathering approach based on two components: textual data of min-
isters’/representatives’ speeches and human codings of these speeches. The data
extraction process firstly involves the transcription of the video footage of public
deliberations in English3 (since meetings are not transcribed) and secondly, the
identification and coding of debates according to a comprehensive codebook,
which contains variables on the debate topic, characteristics of the speaker, the
language of the original/non-translated speech, and the general approval a speaker
expresses during a debate. Full details are in the Online appendix.
The most important information contained in DICEU data for substantive
purposes relates to the speaker’s general approval of the proposal(s) being nego-
tiated. We therefore introduce the general approval variable in some depth here. To
generate this variable, coders identify a major dimension of contestation within
each debate. For instance, this may be “Approval of the Commission’s proposal
on X”. Due to rather uniform practices used by Council presidencies to structure
and moderate debates, this dimension is almost without exception about
(dis)approval of either (a) a legislative proposal presented by the European
Commission; (b) the Council state of play on a proposal (e.g. a presidency com-
promise proposal, negotiations at lower bureaucratic levels); or (c) the state of
negotiations with the European Parliament (EP) (e.g. a presidency’s mandate for
negotiations with the EP). In fact, many presidencies close their entry statement by
asking whether delegations “approve” of a proposal or compromise proposal.
Coders use a five-point Likert item to assess the degree of approval of each
actor speaking in the debate:
1. The speaker expresses full approval.
2. The speaker expresses more approval than disapproval.
3. The speaker expresses a balance of approval and disapproval.
4. The speaker expresses more disapproval than approval.
5. The speaker expresses full disapproval.
6. Degree of approval cannot be assessed (applies to very short or irrelevant
interventions).
The resulting dataset (excluding descriptive variables, such as the position of the
speaker) can be thought of as a DA matrix, in which D denotes debates and A
denotes the actors/speakers. Each element of the matrix is a coding of the actor on
the general approval item. We assessed the inter-coder reliability of our human
codings using Krippendorff’s alpha. For the general approval variable that is
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measured on the same scale in each debate, alpha is 0.82, based on a random
sample of double-coded debates (see the Online appendix). In the following, we
assume that national delegations are unitary actors. Hence, we analytically pool all
speakers giving speeches for the same national delegation (e.g. the French perma-
nent representative and the French minister).4 Dimension A therefore has 28 col-
umns for the national delegations plus one column for the European Commission
that usually participates in debates (e.g. introduces a new legislative proposal) and
one column for “other” actors (e.g. in ECOFIN usually the European Central
Bank (ECB) that contributes to some debates). The resulting text corpus contain-
ing the speech transcriptions is likewise a DAmatrix, in which each element is all
text produced by an actor in one debate, i.e. we simply pool all speech interven-
tions if an actor speaks more than once during a debate.
To validate the DICEU approach, we have applied it to all public deliberations
held in the ECOFIN Council configuration between 2010 and 2015. From mid-
2011 onwards, all videos of public deliberations are available on the Council’s
video streaming website. In addition, we were able to obtain the videos of several
meetings held in 2010 and the first half of 2011 from the Council Secretariat. We
focus on the ECOFIN configuration in this time frame for two reasons: first,
economic and financial affairs is a policy area in which we have much prior knowl-
edge of governments’ preferences and available criteria to cross-validate our data
with. For instance, we expect to see differences in the positions of net contributors
and net beneficiaries of the EU budget (e.g. Bailer et al., 2015). Likewise, we
anticipate a divide between creditors and debtors during the Eurozone crisis.
Second, during this period, ECOFIN dealt with a high number of very salient
and important legislative files and was arguably the main locus of EU secondary
law-making activity. Prominent legislative packages include the banking union, the
“two-pack” and “six-pack”, and several issues on taxation (such as the financial
transaction tax) as well as the always salient annual budget negotiations. In addi-
tion to our ECOFIN data, we also collected further data on a selection of files
negotiated between 2006 and 2008 for further validation purposes with expert
data, detailed below.
In total, our DICEU dataset from ECOFIN comprises of 1195 debate partic-
ipations by national delegations, the Commission and other actors (e.g. the ECB)
from 89 debates.5 Debates lasted 42 minutes on average, but vary considerably in
length with a standard deviation of almost 37 minutes. The median number of
words spoken by a representative during a debate is 242 and the mean is 377.
Across all debates, the British delegation spoke more than any other national
delegation (about 29,000 words), but less than a third of the 91,000 words
spoken by Commission representatives. The Online appendix contains further
details on the data, including various descriptive statistics as well as a detailed
analysis of the missing data patterns in DICEU data, which shows that the under-
lying missing data processes are likely “ignorable”. In the subsequent sections, we
evaluate the validity of the key measures included in DICEU data.
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Face validity: Ideal points from human coding and text
We first assess face validity, i.e. the extent to which DICEU data appears to cap-
ture legislative politics in the Council accurately, by scaling governments’ ideal
points6 from our ECOFIN debates between 2010 and 2015. To measure govern-
ments’ ideal points, we use our human codings of approval as well as our debate
transcriptions. We assume that the conflict space in the ECOFIN Council is uni-
dimensional, but this assumption could be relaxed in future work. To scale govern-
ments’ ideal points based on the general approval variable, we use a Bayesian
mixed factor analysis model that is equivalent to a standard two-parameter IRT
model with a probit link, when the items are ordinal as in our case (Quinn, 2004).
The model assumes that the observed responses xij, where i denotes governments/
actors and j denotes items, are determined by a matrix of latent variables xij as well
as cut-points c (Quinn, 2004: 339). In our case, this simplifies to
xij ¼ c (1)
xij 2 cjðc1Þ; cjc½  (2)
where c indexes the categories in our general approval items and takes values from
1 (full approval) to 5 (full disapproval). Equation (2) imposes a strict ordinal
relationship between the latent responses and the categories of our items. The
factor analytic model for the ideal points of the governments derives as
Xi ¼ Khi þ ei (3)
where Xi is the vector of government i’s latent responses, K is a matrix of factor
loadings of the items on the estimated factors, hi is the vector of governments’
factor scores, and ei is the error term. Setting the first element of hi1 to 1 turns the
first element of Kj1 into the item’s difficulty parameter, Kj2 into the item’s discrim-
ination parameter, and hi2 into the government’s factor score on the first dimen-
sion, i.e. her ideal point (Armstrong et al. 2014: 296). The model is fitted via a
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm (further details are in the
Online appendix).
We also analyze the transcriptions of the debates without any form of human
coding using two closely related unsupervised text scaling models as well as sen-
timent analysis. First, we employ the standard Wordfish Poisson text scaling model
(Slapin and Proksch, 2008), which has already been used for applications in EU
politics (e.g. Franchino and Mariotto, 2012). We simply pool all interventions by a
government across all debates in one document. Second, we use the Wordshoal
model recently proposed by Lauderdale and Herzog (2016), which is a two-stage
procedure relying on Wordfish estimates for each debate that are subsequently
used as data in a Bayesian factor analysis. The Wordfish estimates of a government
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in the debates it participated in, wij, where j denotes the debate, are used as data in
the second stage and assumed to be a linear function of the government’s ideal
point, hi (see Lauderdale and Herzog, 2016: 378)
wijNðaj þ bjhi; siÞ (4)
where aj is a debate fixed effect and bj a debate loading (or debate marginal effect)
that indicates how strongly a debate is associated with the common latent dimen-
sion. The Wordshoal model is fitted using an MCMC algorithm for the second
stage. Third, we also use the Lexicoder sentiment dictionary (Young and Soroka,
2012) to calculate a standard measure of “tone” for each government. Tone simply
is the difference between positive (þ negated negative) and negative (þ negated
positive) words divided by all words.
In total, we estimate four different types of ideal points for each government: IRT
approval is an estimate from human coding of a government’s approval of the state
of negotiations (general approval variable), Wordfish is the Poisson text scaling
estimate, Wordshoal is the two-stage estimate with Wordfish for each debate and
a Bayesian factor analysis on top, and tone is the Lexicoder sentiment. Table 1
displays correlations between the four types of ideal points for our 28 governments.
The correlations are strikingly high between 0.73 and 0.95. It is particularly
noteworthy that we find a high correlation of 0.81 between Wordfish and IRT
approval. This suggests that models based on Poisson text scaling primarily cap-
ture to what extent governments approve of the state of play of negotiations in the
Council. Hence, if researchers are only interested in a general conflict dimension
about the approval of EU legislation, they may reliably use Wordfish
(or Wordshoal) in future projects.
Next, we investigate more closely the actor alignments on the main conflict
dimension in public ECOFIN deliberations by plotting governments’ estimated
ideal points from the IRT approval model and the Wordfish model in Figure 1
(a) and (b). Figure 1(c) shows a strong correlation between the two types of ideal
points. The figure also reveals a clear north–west versus south–east cleavage with
the United Kingdom, Sweden, the Netherlands, or Denmark among the least
approving of ECOFIN politics and countries such as Greece, Cyprus, Estonia,
or Croatia among the most approving. Figure 1(d) confirms the findings from the
approval IRT by demonstrating that the member states in the north–west are also
Table 1. Correlations between four types of ideal points.
IRT approval Wordfish Wordshoal Tone
IRT approval 1 0.81 0.77 –0.78
Wordfish 0.81 1 0.95 –0.81
Wordshoal 0.77 0.95 1 –0.73
Tone –0.78 –0.81 –0.73 1
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Figure 1. Comparison of ideal points from different scaling methods: (a) Ideal points from IRT
approval, (b) Ideal points from Wordfish, (c) IRT approval and Wordfish, and (d) IRT approval and
tone. Note: 95% credible/confidence intervals as vertical lines in panels (a) and (b); linear regres-
sion line in panels (c) and (d). AT: Austria; BE: Belgium; BG: Bulgaria; HR: Croatia; CY: Cyprus;
CZ: The Czech Republic; DK: Denmark; EE: Estonia; FI: Finland; FR: France; DE: Germany; EL:
Greece; HU: Hungary; IE: Ireland; IT: Italy; LV: Latvia; LT: Lithuania; LU: Luxembourg; MT: Malta;
NL: The Netherlands; PL: Poland; PT: Portugal; RO: Romania; SI: Slovenia; SK: Slovakia; ES: Spain;
SE: Sweden; UK: The United Kingdom. Since Croatia joined the EU in 2013, the measurement of
its position is less reliable; the country is also placed less extreme in the Wordshoal model
(not shown).
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speaking in a more negative tone (in line with their disapproval of Council politics)
than those from the south–east. These actor alignments replicate prominent find-
ings in the literature on north–south, north–south–east, and east–west divides
between governments in the EU (Mattila, 2009; Plechanovova, 2011; Thomson,
2011; Veen, 2011).
They also provide new insights into Council politics, as they suggest that in the
context of ECOFIN negotiations, Western and Northern member states were the
least approving of and most negative about legislative politics. In the Online
appendix, we analyze the substantive meaning of the north–west versus south–
east conflict dimension present in our sample of ECOFIN debates. This reveals
that, broadly speaking, the rich member states in the north–west preferred smaller
EU budgets and emphasized economic competitiveness, while the poorer states in
the south–east preferred larger budgets and emphasized economic regulation.
An additional benefit of the DICEU approach is that it enables us to investigate
the dynamics of legislative politics in the Council over time. As an example, we can
track the relevance of the latent conflict dimension as scaled from the Wordshoal
model over time. This allows us to asses when the actor alignments in public
deliberations in ECOFIN were particularly aligned with the main latent conflict
dimension. Or less technically, when was the north–west versus south–east divide
most clearly visible? To answer this question, Figure 2 plots the absolute
Wordshoal debate loadings, bj, over time with a simple locally estimated scatter-
plot smoothing (LOESS) regression line. This illustrates that the conflict between
member states in the north–west versus south–east became more prevalent in
ECOFIN debates between mid-2012 and mid-2013 and remained important.7 In
the Online appendix, we also plot the debate-specific ideal points of all national
governments from our Wordshoal results, wij  bj, to further illustrate DICEU
data’s potential to investigate dynamics.
In sum, our analyses demonstrate a high level of face validity of DICEU data.
Moreover, DICEU data provide us with new research opportunities, for instance,
to investigate the Council deliberations in a temporal dimension or measure actors’
attention to different political issues, which we illustrate in the Online appendix
using dictionary approaches as an example.
Convergent validity: Comparison with expert data
Next, we assess convergent validity, i.e. the convergence of information retrieved
from Council deliberations with existing measures expected to capture similar
constructs. Given the limited data available on government positions in the
Council, DEU data represents the closest we get to a “gold standard” for measure-
ments of actors’ positions in the Council to be used for cross-validation. Following
the DEU project’s assumption that experts report the most important issues relat-
ed to a proposal as well as actors’ initial negotiation positions on these issues (that
is, immediately after the introduction of a proposal), we expect that DICEU
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positions should converge to information from DEU under the following
assumptions:
1. Actors discuss the most important issues regarding a legislative proposal in
public deliberations in the Council.
2. Actors reveal their negotiation positions in public deliberations.
3. Actors do not change their negotiation positions between the introduction of a
proposal and its discussion in public deliberations.
We can check if (1) holds true by ascertaining how many issues from the DEU data
are discussed in public deliberations. Moreover, assumption (3) should hold for
Council deliberations that coincide with the introduction of a proposal or shortly
thereafter. In case assumption (2) holds, we would thus expect to find high con-
vergence between DEU and DICEU positions if the Council deliberations are held
in close proximity to the introduction of the proposal. To ascertain this conver-
gence, we identified a total of 21 legislative proposals covered in the DEU data that
were placed as “B items” for first discussion on agendas of Council meetings after
spring 2006, and could therefore, in principle, have been discussed in public. We
were able to gather a dataset of re-digitized video footage from the Council’s
Figure 2. Absolute values of debate loadings from Wordshoal over time.
Note: Solid line is LOESS regression line with span¼ 0.75; dots are bj.
Wratil and Hobolt 11
archives covering public deliberations on 17 of these 21 proposals that were dis-
cussed in different Council configurations (not only ECOFIN).
This dataset provides us with a unique opportunity to cross-validate video-
based with expert-based data. According to DEU experts, actors were divided
on a total of 50 issues regarding these 17 proposals. Our coders identified a
clear majority of 31 of these 50 DEU issues as discussion points in the videos of
the public deliberations, and 12 of the DEU issues were discussed in more than one
Council meeting. This demonstrates that there is some relationship between the
main legislative issues identified by experts and the issues debated in public sessions
of the Council. Furthermore, for the subset of issues covered by DEU and in the
videos our coders placed actors on the DEU issue scales, based on their DICEU
speeches. This allows us to directly compare information retrieved from experts
and from videos on the same scale (i.e. the DEU issue scales).
Coders identified a total of 209 overlapping positions on 26 DEU issues, that is,
in 209 cases, actors could be placed on the predefined DEU scales from 0 to 100
based on video footage and DEU experts had reported their positions in inter-
views. The correlation of the DEU expert positions and the positions from the
videos coded on the DEU scale is 0.60 with an average absolute distance between
the positions of 23 points on the DEU scale. Hence, the positional information
contained in DEU and DICEU is similar but clearly not identical. Yet differences
between DICEU and DEU could stem from violations of assumption (3) as well as
measurement error in both datasets instead of violations of assumption (2). Hence,
we investigate whether convergence increases when public deliberations are held in
close temporal proximity to the introduction of a proposal, and for particularly
salient issues, where it should be easier for DEU experts and DICEU coders to
accurately identify actors’ positions.
Table 2 shows the results of a linear regression of the absolute distance between
the DEU and the DICEU placements on our 209 overlapping positions on a var-
iable indicating the time lag between the introduction of the proposal and the
public deliberation (within six months, within 6–12 months, after 12 months) as
well as the salience of an issue to the actor as reported by DEU experts. Two-way
cluster-robust standard errors, accounting for the nesting of positions within
actors and issues, are shown in parentheses. As expected, the results demonstrate
that DEU and DICEU placements are much closer when DICEU codings are from
public deliberations held within the first year of the introduction of the legislative
proposal, and for salient issues.
In fact, if an issue was discussed within six months of the Commission’s legis-
lative proposal and the issue was highly salient to the actor (actor salience¼ 100),
our model predicts DEU and DICEU measures to diverge by only 9.8 DEU scale
points on average. Similarly, the correlation of positions reported by experts and
those coded from videos rises to 0.78 for public deliberations within the first year
after the Commission’s proposal and with actor salience > 50. Hence, initial nego-
tiation positions retrieved from expert interviews and positions coded from videos
of public deliberations strongly converge when the issue is salient and the time lag
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between the introduction of the proposal and the public deliberation is short. The
DICEU approach can therefore provide similar information to the DEU approach
about initial negotiation positions.
Predictive validity: Forecasting opposition votes
In addition to face and convergent validity, we also assess predictive validity, i.e.
the question of whether variation in DICEU measures can forecast events; specif-
ically, governments’ voting behavior in the Council. This allows us to assess wheth-
er governments practice what they preach: are governments’ statements in public
deliberations an indication of their subsequent voting behavior on these acts in
the Council?
For this purpose, we collected the voting sheets for a total of 95 legislative acts
that were discussed in our 89 debates.8 Out of these, six acts had not been decided
on at the time of writing this article, five acts the Commission had withdrawn
before voting, one act was non-legislative and not voted on, and for three acts
we were unable to obtain voting results from the Council’s register. Of the remain-
ing 80 acts we observed 2194 votes by governments with 53 “No” and 30
“Abstain” votes. In line with common practice in the field, we pool no votes
and abstentions as “opposition votes” (e.g. Bailer et al., 2015; Hagemann et al.,
2017). Note that with 3.8% opposition votes, voting on ECOFIN files in this
period is clearly more contentious than voting has been historically across
Council configurations (averaging around 1–2% opposition votes). To assess the
predictive validity of DICEU data for opposition votes, we use the DICEU general
approval variable introduced above, which was coded at least from one debate for
1745 of our 2194 votes. Recall that this variable indicates the tendency to approve
Table 2. Predicting the distance between DEU
and DICEU positions.
Estimates
Within 6–12 months 5.03
(3.65)
After 12 months 13.41
(5.98)*
Salience –0.16
(0.05)*
Constant 26.13
(5.01)*
R2 0.05
N 209
Note: Linear regression; cluster-robust standard errors
by actors and issues in parentheses; *p< 0.05.
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of the state of negotiations. In Figure 3, we show the association between oppo-
sition/no votes and the general approval variable.9
This descriptive overview reveals a strong association between governments’
approval of an act in the public deliberations and their later voting behavior on
this act. Goodman and Kruskal’s gamma is 0.72 for the association between oppo-
sition votes and approval and 0.78 for the association between no votes and
approval. If governments expressed more approval than disapproval or even full
approval, 1% or less of the votes were opposition or no votes. However, if govern-
ments on balance expressed more disapproval or even full disapproval, the fraction
of subsequent no votes rose to 9% and that of opposition votes to 18%. This
illustrates the basic predictive validity of DICEU measures for governments’
voting behavior.
But do DICEU data simply capture factors that we know from the literature
predict opposition votes, or do they contain novel information that contributes to
predicting opposition votes while controlling for other factors? To answer this
question, we run logistic regression models with the binary indicator of opposition
votes as dependent variable, the DICEU disapproval measure (running from 1 “full
approval” to 5 “full disapproval”) as main independent variable, and controls
from a standard Council voting model as in Hagemann et al. (2017). Following
Hagemann et al. (2017), we include a measure of Public opinion on European
integration from the Eurobarometer series, specifically the “EU image” question,
to detect signaling to domestic audiences (see also Wratil, 2018b). To capture the
Figure 3. DICEU general approval and opposition/no votes.
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“party politics” thesis, we use measures of Government parties’ positions on EU
integration and left–right at the time of the last election from the Comparative
Manifesto Project’s (CMP) coding of election manifestos (Volkens et al., 2018;
Wratil, 2018a). Further, we account for economic interest explanations with meas-
ures of the Receipts from the EU budget (in % of national gross domestic product)
as well as the national Unemployment and Inflation rates (Bailer et al., 2015). Last,
we use a dummy variable for votes on Budget acts (e.g. draft amending annual
budgets), since opposition votes on budget acts are much more frequent than on
other legislative files (74 out of the 83 opposition votes occurred on acts concerning
the EU budget). We impute missing values using chained equations with predictive
mean matching (see the Online appendix for full details on variables
and imputation).
In Table 3, we report the results from a baseline model (Model 1) and a model
adding country fixed effects (Model 2), which reduces our sample to just 18 coun-
tries that casted at least one opposition vote. The results demonstrate that the
DICEU approval variable is a strong predictor of opposition votes even when
controlling for other factors from the literature. The more disapproval
Table 3. Logit models predicting opposition votes in the Council.
Model 1 Model 2
DICEU disapproval 0.54 0.38
(0.13)* (0.18)*
Public opinion –2.74 –4.84
(0.66)* (1.63)*
Government position EU integration –0.17 0.10
(0.08)* (0.19)
Government position left–right 0.02 –0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Receipts from EU budget –0.25 0.15
(0.15) (0.63)
Unemployment rate –0.13 –0.42
(0.05)* (0.17)*
Inflation rate 0.10 0.25
(0.10) (0.13)
Budget acts 0.88 1.18
(0.40)* (0.44)*
Constant 4.03 12.05
(2.19) (6.15)
Number of acts 80 80
Number of countries 28 18
Country fixed effects No Yes
N 2194 1436
Note: Logistic regressions; standard errors in parentheses; *p< 0.05.
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governments show in public deliberations, the more likely they are to cast an
opposition vote. Hence, DICEU positions do not only capture the effect of
other variables but provide us with new information to predict Council voting.
In addition, we find support for the “signaling” explanation of Council votes, since
the coefficient on public opinion is a statistically significant predictor, indicating
that governments facing more Eurosceptic publics cast more opposition votes. In
contrast, we find little support for the “party politics” explanation, except for one
significant coefficient on the government parties’ position on EU integration.
In sum, our results demonstrate that DICEU positions have strong predictive
validity with regard to Council voting and a significant part of the information
they provide is novel and cannot be substituted by common other predictors of
Council voting from the literature.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced and validated a new data source and approach
for studying politics in the Council of the European Union. The DICEU approach
extracts and codes textual data from videos of public deliberations in the Council,
a data source not used in any publication in political science so far. We have
addressed the face, convergent, and predictive validity of data gathered with
this approach.
Studying the Council from videos of its public deliberations has obvious advan-
tages. Most importantly, it is the most direct way of measuring government posi-
tions during actual negotiations, since it does not rely on the recollection or
interpretation by third parties (e.g. experts, presidencies). This approach can
also be applied by researchers across the world at any time and the analyses are
fully replicable.10 Video data also bridge the gap between the well-established
expert data projects (such as DEU) that measure initial negotiation positions
before bargaining takes place and voting data that reveal government positions
after negotiations are concluded. Video data essentially open up the black box of
Council negotiations, although – as with any other forum for political negotiation
– we can never be certain what is happening informally behind closed doors.
Our pilot dataset on public deliberations in ECOFIN can be easily extended in
the future. The finding that QTA estimates (e.g. from Wordfish and Wordshoal)
correlate highly with estimates from models based on human coding suggests that
collecting transcriptions of debates without extensive and costly human coding
may be sufficient for many research projects. Proksch et al. (2019) have recently
validated the use of automatic speech recognition systems to transcribe video and
audio material for QTA. Based on these findings, future projects can analyze the
abundance of available video data from further Council configurations and other
time frames by simply feeding it into an automatic speech recognition system
(e.g. Google’s Speech application programming interface or YouTube) and ana-
lyzing retrieved transcriptions through QTA models. Our results indicate that
Poisson text scaling models will retrieve a conflict dimension that largely reflects
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the approval of EU legislation by governments. The interpretation of quantities of
interest from any other text models should be validated by researchers (e.g. on the
basis of hand-coded sub-samples).
DICEU data will enable researchers to address new research questions about
Council politics and multilevel governance. Crucially, many questions about
dynamics can now be addressed, as changes in actors’ positions can be analyzed.
Moreover, in the ideal point framework, changes in positions over time can be
identified by disentangling debate- or period-specific effects from genuine move-
ments on the latent dimension (see Martin and Quinn, 2002). Dynamic ideal point
models are either available already (e.g. Martin and Quinn, 2002; Schnakenberg
and Fariss, 2013) or can be easily developed from their existing static versions
(Lauderdale and Herzog, 2016: 392). We can thus use DICEU data to address
questions such as: when and why are governments changing positions in the
Council and what are the effects on the bargaining process and outcomes?
Beyond the dynamic perspective, the linguistic characteristics of text from video
data provide new opportunities for innovative projects. These are not limited to
the application of standard scaling models like Wordfish and Wordshoal, but
could also include dictionary-based approaches to sentiment, complexity, or tech-
nicality of speech, as well as topic models to measure issue attention or arguments
(e.g. Grimmer, 2010; Roberts et al., 2014). Moreover, the growing methodological
literature on the analysis of audio-visual features (e.g. Dietrich et al., 2018; Knox
and Lucas, 2018; Schonhardt-Bailey, 2017), such as facial expressions or vocal
pitch, suggests that DICEU data could be used in the future to systematically
measure these novel aspects of political communication in the Council.
As any data source, videos of public deliberations have their limitations. One
weakness of these data compared to expert data is that it will always be finite. Not
all national delegations speak in all debates and on all topics. Hence, if researchers
are interested in coding government positions on very specific issues, they may
encounter missing data. The underlying missing data process is likely ignorable
(see the Online appendix), and for many analyses that are prone to missing data,
the use of multiple imputation techniques will suffice to obtain unbiased estimates.
However, where analysis models are very sensitive to missing data, such as tests of
competing bargaining models (e.g. Slapin, 2014; Thomson, 2011), this may present
a limitation of the DICEU approach.
Our choice of data sources and collection strategies should be guided by the
questions we ask. We believe that many key questions in European politics can be
addressed by studying videos of public deliberations in the Council, and by making
the DICEU dataset publicly available, we hope that researchers will be able to
answer some of these.
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Notes
1. Note that the Council can still deliberate in closed session over non-legislative issues
such as implementation of legislation or preparations of international events
(e.g. G7, G20).
2. As with any other legislature, we do not know what happens behind the scenes and to
what extent public deliberations are representative of the broader process of negotiations
(e.g. in COREPER, “Comite´ des repre´sentants permanents”, and the working groups).
3. When the speaker does not speak in English, we use the simultaneous translation into
English provided by the Council’s interpreters. Note that representatives can freely
choose the language they use, since all speech is simultaneously translated into all offi-
cial EU languages. Eighty-three percent of representatives choose to address the
Council in English. Pooling speeches by English native speakers, non-native speakers
using English as well as speakers translated into English best reflects the actual conduct
of negotiations. De Vries et al. (2018) demonstrate that texts translated into other
languages yield almost identical estimates in quantitative text models as the original
texts. In the Online appendix, we also show that language choice made no difference to
the human codings we obtained.
4. Note that according to our data about 70% of all speeches are given by national
ministers. However, this information is primarily based on participant lists included
in press releases and we found these to be inaccurate in many cases, without an obvi-
ous bias.
5. Note that we do not code any discussions with less than two national delegations
(excluding the presidency) participating. Seventeen of such discussions occurred in
our period of investigation. Hence, our data covers around 84% (89 out of 106) of
all discussions in the Council, and the remaining 16% are by definition very short
discussions with only a few participating actors.
6. In the ideal point models described below, we also estimate the positions of the
European Commission and “other” speakers (usually the ECB). But we do not report
their positions. It turns out that due to specificities of the human coding instructions,
these actors have very different ideal points when scaled from human coding as opposed
to speeches. Re-estimating all models without these actors yields substantively the same
high correlations between governments’ ideal points.
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7. Obviously, this increased relevance can be due to changing actor alignments, or alter-
natively, to a changing political agenda, e.g. new legislative issues that more strongly
mobilize the north–west versus south–east divide. We therefore hand-coded debates and
separated them into five different issue areas. This reveals that the debate loadings
showed upward trends over time in four out of these five areas, suggesting that the
increased relevance of the latent conflict dimension is not due to certain issues reaching
the political agenda.
8. Note that a single debate can deal with no (e.g. on the presidency work program), one,
or several specific legislative acts (e.g. debate on banking union).
9. If more than one debate was held on an act and approval was coded for more than one
debate, we take its coded value from the chronologically first debate on an act. In the
Online appendix, we report results using the last debate on an act.
10. Video material is rarely used to systematically measure government positions in inter-
national negotiations, but one exception is McKibben’s (2016) study of multilateral
climate change negotiations using archived webcasts.
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